vulnerability / NVI-00018352 / Revision 1
CoreWCF: WS-Security signature substitution via document-wide Signature lookup
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for CoreWCF.Primitives, CoreWCF.Primitives. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.9 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
CoreWCF.Primitives
source listed< 1.8.1
### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before `wsse:Security` can embed a `ds:Signature` of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header. #### Preconditions Exploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a `ds:Signature` whose `KeyInfo` resolves through the receive-side token resolver to a key under the attacker’s control. Both are conditions outside the attacker’s direct control on a generic deployment. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds Use a security token resolver that only accepts references to issuer-pinned X.509 chains (the default when expecting a static set of signing certificates).
CoreWCF.Primitives
source listed>= 1.9.0, < 1.9.1
### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before `wsse:Security` can embed a `ds:Signature` of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header. #### Preconditions Exploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a `ds:Signature` whose `KeyInfo` resolves through the receive-side token resolver to a key under the attacker’s control. Both are conditions outside the attacker’s direct control on a generic deployment. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds Use a security token resolver that only accepts references to issuer-pinned X.509 chains (the default when expecting a static set of signing certificates).
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.