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vulnerability / NVI-00018359 / Revision 1

NodeVM network builtin exclusions bypass via internal _http_client and _http_server

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vm2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6pCVE-2026-47139

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

8.6 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

vm2

source listed
  • <= 3.11.3

## Summary `NodeVM` supports excluding public network builtins from the wildcard builtin option. With this configuration direct access to `http`, `https`, `http2`, `net`, `dgram`, `tls`, `dns`, and `dns/promises` is blocked. However, Node.js also exposes underscored internal HTTP builtins such as `_http_client` and `_http_server`. These are not blocked when the public modules are excluded. Sandboxed code can use these internal builtins to make outbound HTTP requests and open listening HTTP sockets even though the public network modules are denied. **Note**: This is not host RCE. It is a network capability bypass that can lead to SSRF-style access to internal services. ## Details The wildcard builtin expansion is based on Node.js builtin module names: ```js const BUILTIN_MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding('natives'))) .filter(s=>!s.startsWith('internal/') && !DANGEROUS_BUILTINS.has(s)); ``` Public modules can be excluded with `-name`: ```js if (builtins.indexOf(`-${name}`) === -1) { addDefaultBuiltin(res, name, hostRequire); } ``` But excluding `http` and `net` does not exclude internal siblings such as: ```text _http_client _

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

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