vulnerability / NVI-00018361 / Revision 1
@angular/platform-server: Missing `` Raw-Text Serialization Escaping leads to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Angular SSR
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of `` elements. When rendering dynamic text content inside a `` element via template bindings (such as `{{ value }}` or `[textContent]`), the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning `` is treated as a raw-text element. However, `domino`'s serializer completely omitted `` from the list of raw-text elements requiring closing-tag escaping during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of `` in the bound dynamic text was **never escaped under any circumstances**. The unescaped closing tag was serialized directly into the output HTML (e.g. `alert(1)`). When parsed by a browser, it closes the `` block early, allowing the injected `` block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cros
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.16
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of `` elements. When rendering dynamic text content inside a `` element via template bindings (such as `{{ value }}` or `[textContent]`), the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning `` is treated as a raw-text element. However, `domino`'s serializer completely omitted `` from the list of raw-text elements requiring closing-tag escaping during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of `` in the bound dynamic text was **never escaped under any circumstances**. The unescaped closing tag was serialized directly into the output HTML (e.g. `alert(1)`). When parsed by a browser, it closes the `` block early, allowing the injected `` block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cros
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.24
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of `` elements. When rendering dynamic text content inside a `` element via template bindings (such as `{{ value }}` or `[textContent]`), the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning `` is treated as a raw-text element. However, `domino`'s serializer completely omitted `` from the list of raw-text elements requiring closing-tag escaping during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of `` in the bound dynamic text was **never escaped under any circumstances**. The unescaped closing tag was serialized directly into the output HTML (e.g. `alert(1)`). When parsed by a browser, it closes the `` block early, allowing the injected `` block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cros
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.25
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of `` elements. When rendering dynamic text content inside a `` element via template bindings (such as `{{ value }}` or `[textContent]`), the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning `` is treated as a raw-text element. However, `domino`'s serializer completely omitted `` from the list of raw-text elements requiring closing-tag escaping during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of `` in the bound dynamic text was **never escaped under any circumstances**. The unescaped closing tag was serialized directly into the output HTML (e.g. `alert(1)`). When parsed by a browser, it closes the `` block early, allowing the injected `` block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cros
@angular/platform-server
source listed<= 18.2.14
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of `` elements. When rendering dynamic text content inside a `` element via template bindings (such as `{{ value }}` or `[textContent]`), the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning `` is treated as a raw-text element. However, `domino`'s serializer completely omitted `` from the list of raw-text elements requiring closing-tag escaping during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of `` in the bound dynamic text was **never escaped under any circumstances**. The unescaped closing tag was serialized directly into the output HTML (e.g. `alert(1)`). When parsed by a browser, it closes the `` block early, allowing the injected `` block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cros
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gxx4-3xcv-f8qx ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.