vulnerability / NVI-00018405 / Revision 1
js-libp2p: Memory DoS via subscription flood of unique topics
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @libp2p/gossipsub. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
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7.5 high
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As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@libp2p/gossipsub
source listed<= 15.0.22
### Summary Three cooperating omissions in `@libp2p/gossipsub` allow an unauthenticated single peer to exhaust the Node.js heap of any gossipsub node with default options. 1. **`defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity`** (`packages/gossipsub/src/message/decodeRpc.ts:11`): no decode-level cap on subscription entries per RPC. 2. **`handleReceivedSubscription` is unbounded** (`gossipsub.ts:1009-1021`): every unique topic string creates a new `Map` entry + `Set` object in `this.topics` with no per-peer count limit. 3. **`removePeer` leaves empty Sets** (`gossipsub.ts:782-784`): after peer disconnect, empty Sets are never deleted from `this.topics` thus memory is non-reclaimable within the process lifetime. A single 4MB LP frame carries 349,525 unique topic SUBSCRIBE entries. Each frame causes ~89MB of heap growth (~22x amplification). A Node.js process with a 1.5GB heap limit crashes after ~17 such frames (~68MB total attacker bandwidth, achievable in ~5 seconds at 100Mbps). ### Details #### Defect 1: `defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxSubscriptions = Infinity` (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11`) ```typescript
03 / Response
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04 / Limits
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05 / Provenance
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- GHSA-4f8r-922h-2vgv ↗
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- Revision 1 ·
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