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vulnerability / NVI-00018412 / Revision 1

Dozzle: Pre-auth SSRF with response-body reflection via POST /api/notifications/test-webhook (default no-auth deploy)

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/amir20/dozzle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-3v9w-6365-9w54CVE-2026-45298

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

8.6 high

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

github.com/amir20/dozzle

source listed
  • <= 8.14.12

## Summary In a default dozzle deploy (the documented quickstart, no `DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER` set), `POST /api/notifications/test-webhook` is reachable without authentication and forwards an attacker-controlled URL into a `WebhookDispatcher` that: - Sends an HTTP POST to the supplied URL with attacker-controlled request headers, and - Returns the response status code AND up to 1MB of the response body to the caller, when the target replies non-2xx. This is a classic full-reflection SSRF, pre-auth, against any IP/port that dozzle's host can route to — including private subnets, link-local cloud metadata, and loopback services. ## Affected versions `internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go` and `internal/web/notifications.go` at commit `581bab3a43ead84ea4d009a469a17af98fb3377f` and earlier (the test-webhook handler has been in place since the notifications subsystem was added). ## Default-deploy reachability chain ``` main.go:58-59 → enforces AuthProvider in {none, forward-proxy, simple} support/cli/args.go:18 → AuthProvider default is "none" main.go:231-243 → when AuthProvider == "none", web.AuthProvider stays at NONE internal/web/routes.go:130-132, 137-13

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-3v9w-6365-9w54 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

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