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vulnerability / NVI-00018427 / Revision 1

stigmem-node: decay sweep expires and counts facts across all tenants (cross-tenant BOLA)

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for stigmem-node. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

stigmem-node

source listed
  • < 0.9.0a12

### Summary On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a caller holding a `write` credential for **one** tenant can run a decay sweep that acts on **every** tenant's facts. The candidate-selection queries in `lifecycle/decay.py` (`_select_ttl_candidates`, `_select_confidence_candidates`) carried no `tenant_id` predicate, and the caller's tenant was not threaded into the sweep or its async worker (`run_decay_sweep` / `_decay_job_worker`), reached via `POST /v1/decay/sweep`. ### Impact A sweep with `ttl_seconds=0` expires **all tenants'** facts — cross-tenant data destruction (integrity and availability). A `dry_run` sweep returns a global candidate count, acting as a cross-tenant existence/volume **oracle** (information disclosure). ### Affected configurations This is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant="default"` — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate. ### Patches Fixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `identi

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

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04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

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05 / Provenance

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  1. GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

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Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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