vulnerability / NVI-00018513 / Revision 1
Bugsink: DOS using large numbers of event tags
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for bugsink. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.3 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
bugsink
source listed<= 2.2.1
### Summary In affected versions, Bugsink stores every tag supplied with an incoming event. An event with an unusually large number of custom (i.e. supplied by an attacker) tags can therefore make ingestion spend more time than intended writing tag rows. Bugsink uses a single-writer database architecture. That keeps the implementation simple, but it also means one expensive write transaction can delay other event digestion while it is running. In this case, it makes ingestion of other events wait until the transaction that writes the tags finishes, which effectively causes a temporary denial of service for other events. ### Impact Submitting such an event requires a valid project DSN. DSNs are sometimes visible in client-side applications, so they should not be treated as a strong security boundary, but the issue is still limited to ingestion for a Bugsink instance that accepts the event. The impact is availability-only. The issue does not expose stored data, modify existing events, or allow code execution. ### Mitigation Update to version 2.2.2, which caps the number of tags stored for a single event. The default cap is 100 tags and can be changed with `MAX_EVENT_TAGS`.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5x67-j5xg-c5gj ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.