vulnerability / NVI-00018529 / Revision 1
Budibase: Row Action Trigger Bypasses View Row Filter Security Boundary Allowing Action on Out-of-Scope Rows
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for budibase. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
budibase
source listed< 3.38.1
## Summary The row action trigger endpoint (`POST /api/tables/:sourceId/actions/:actionId/trigger`) fails to validate that the user-supplied `rowId` is within the scope of the view's row filters. A user with access to a filtered view can trigger row actions on any row in the underlying table, including rows explicitly excluded by the view's security filters. ## Details View filters in Budibase are treated as a security boundary. The search path (`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/rows/search.ts:93-94`) explicitly enforces view query filters with the comment: *"that could let users find rows they should not be allowed to access."* However, the row action trigger path bypasses this enforcement entirely: 1. **Route** (`packages/server/src/api/routes/rowAction.ts:55-59`): Accepts a `sourceId` that can be a viewId. 2. **Middleware** (`packages/server/src/middleware/triggerRowActionAuthorised.ts:24-55`): Correctly validates that the user has READ permission on the view and that the row action is enabled for that view. However, at line 55 it sets `ctx.params.tableId = tableId` where `tableId` is the **underlying table** extracted from the viewId — the viewId is discarded. ```typesc
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-3263-v5v9-xq8q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.