vulnerability / NVI-00018601 / Revision 1
Picklescan is Vulnerable to Unsafe Globals Check Bypass through Subclass Imports
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for picklescan. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.3 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
picklescan
source listed<= 0.0.30
### Summary The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass PickleScan's unsafe globals check, leading to potential arbitrary code execution. The issue stems from PickleScan's strict check for full module names against its list of unsafe globals. By using subclasses of dangerous imports instead of the exact module names, attackers can circumvent the check and inject malicious payloads. ### PoC 1. Download a model that uses the `asyncio` package: ```wget https://huggingface.co/iluem/linux_pkl/resolve/main/asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl``` 2. Check with PickleScan: `picklescan -p asyncio_asyncio_unix_events___UnixSubprocessTransport__start.pkl -g` **Expected Result:** PickleScan should identify all `asyncio` import as dangerous and flag the pickle file as malicious as `asyncio` is in `_unsafe_globals` dictionary. **Actual Result:** !Screenshot 2025-06-29 at 14 13 38 PickleScan marked the import as Suspicious, failing to identify it as a dangerous import. ### Impact **Severity**: High **Affected Users**: Any organization, like HuggingFace, or individual usi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-f7qq-56ww-84cr ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.