vulnerability / NVI-00018614 / Revision 1
Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated RCE via Chromium launch-argument injection in browser_config.extra_args
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for crawl4ai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
10 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
crawl4ai
source listed<= 0.8.9
### Summary The Docker API server accepted a request-supplied `browser_config.extra_args`, which flowed into Chromium's launch arguments. An attacker could inject Chromium switches that replace a child-process launch command (`--utility-cmd-prefix`, `--renderer-cmd-prefix`, `--gpu-launcher`, `--browser-subprocess-path`) together with `--no-zygote`, causing Chromium to fork/exec an attacker-controlled command as the container's runtime user. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default, so a single request yields arbitrary command execution. The earlier `extra_args` SSRF patch (0.8.9) used a denylist scoped to proxy/DNS flags; a denylist of launch switches is inherently incomplete, and these command-execution switches were not covered. ### Affected paths `/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/crawl/job` accepting a request `browser_config.extra_args`. ### Impact Unauthenticated remote code execution as the container runtime user; full read/write of application data, mounted secrets, environment, and tokens, and out-of-band exfiltration independent of the HTTP response. ### Fix 0.9.0 establishes a trust boundary for request-supplied configuration: `extra_args` (along with other power f
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-r253-r9jw-qg44 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.