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vulnerability / NVI-00018625 / Revision 1

NATS Server may fail to authorize certain Jetstream admin APIs

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2, github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-fhg8-qxh5-7q3wCVE-2025-30215

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

9.6 critical

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

source listed
  • >= 2.11.0-RC.1, < 2.11.1

## Advisory The management of JetStream assets happens with messages in the `$JS.` subject namespace in the system account; this is partially exposed into regular accounts to allow account holders to manage their assets. Some of the JS API requests were missing access controls, allowing any user with JS management permissions in any account to perform certain administrative actions on any JS asset in any other account. At least one of the unprotected APIs allows for data destruction. None of the affected APIs allow disclosing stream contents. ### Affected versions NATS Server: * Version 2 from v2.2.0 onwards, prior to v2.11.1 or v2.10.27 ----- ## Original Report (Lightly edited to confirm some supposition and in the summary to use past tense) ### Summary nats-server did not include authorization checks on 4 separate admin-level JetStream APIs: account purge, server remove, account stream move, and account stream cancel-move. In all cases, APIs are not properly restricted to system-account users. Instead, _any_ authorized user can execute the APIs, including across account boundaries, as long as the current user merely has permission to publish on `$JS.>`. Only the fir

GitHub Advisory Database

github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

source listed
  • >= 2.2.0, < 2.10.27

## Advisory The management of JetStream assets happens with messages in the `$JS.` subject namespace in the system account; this is partially exposed into regular accounts to allow account holders to manage their assets. Some of the JS API requests were missing access controls, allowing any user with JS management permissions in any account to perform certain administrative actions on any JS asset in any other account. At least one of the unprotected APIs allows for data destruction. None of the affected APIs allow disclosing stream contents. ### Affected versions NATS Server: * Version 2 from v2.2.0 onwards, prior to v2.11.1 or v2.10.27 ----- ## Original Report (Lightly edited to confirm some supposition and in the summary to use past tense) ### Summary nats-server did not include authorization checks on 4 separate admin-level JetStream APIs: account purge, server remove, account stream move, and account stream cancel-move. In all cases, APIs are not properly restricted to system-account users. Instead, _any_ authorized user can execute the APIs, including across account boundaries, as long as the current user merely has permission to publish on `$JS.>`. Only the fir

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-fhg8-qxh5-7q3w ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

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