vulnerability / NVI-00018632 / Revision 1
Gitea: Stored XSS via glTF `extensionsRequired` in Gitea 3D File Viewer
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.7 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
code.gitea.io/gitea
source listed>= 1.25.0, < 1.26.0
## Summary Me again. Gitea's built-in 3D file viewer (powered by Online3DViewer) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS) through crafted `.gltf` files. When a glTF file declares an unsupported required extension, Online3DViewer generates an error message containing the extension name and Gitea inserts it into the DOM using `innerHTML` without sanitization. An attacker who can push a `.gltf` file to any repository can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of any user who views the file. ## Affected Versions - Gitea **1.25.0** and later (3D file preview was introduced in 1.25 via the Online3DViewer integration) - Confirmed on `gitea:1.25-nightly` (SHA `e33d1da...`), which bundles `online-3d-viewer` npm package v0.16.0 - The upstream Online3DViewer library is the root cause ## Severity - Stored XSS: the payload persists in the repository and fires on every page view - Executes under the Gitea origin with the victim's session (cookies, CSRF tokens) - Any authenticated user viewing the file is compromised - Enables full account takeover (token creation, settings modification, repository manipulation) - No user interacti
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9cpj-qc93-vw8v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.