vulnerability / NVI-00020080 / Revision 1
Copyparty has unexpected JavaScript execution via crafted URL to folder with `.prologue.html`
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for copyparty. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.7 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
copyparty
source listed< 1.20.12
If an attacker has been given both read- and write-permissions to the server, they can upload a malicious file with the filename `.prologue.html` and then craft a link to potentially execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's context. Note that it is intended behavior that the JavaScript would execute if the target clicks a link to the HTML file itself; "https://example.com/foo/.prologue.html". The vulnerability is that "https://example.com/foo/?b" would also evaluate the file, making the behavior unexpected. There are existing preventative measures (strict SameSite cookies) which makes it harder to leverage this vulnerability in an attack; in order to gain control of the target's authenticated session, the link must be clicked from a page served by the server itself -- most likely by editing an existing resource, which would require additional access permissions. Finally, for this attack to be successful, the attacker's target must click the specific crafted link given by the attacker. This vulnerability is not activated by normally browsing the web-UI on the server. ## Impact If successful, the malicious JavaScript could move or delete existing files on the server, or uplo
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rcp6-88mm-9vgf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.