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vulnerability / NVI-00020082 / Revision 1

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-mg4f-x9v4-6h2pCVE-2026-55982

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

code.gitea.io/gitea

source listed
  • < 1.27.0

### Summary The OIDC userinfo endpoint (`GET /login/oauth/userinfo`) accepts Gitea API tokens as bearer credentials but does not enforce API token scopes before returning identity claims. A personal access token scoped only to `read:misc` can successfully retrieve user information from the OIDC userinfo endpoint, even though the same token is denied access to user-related REST API endpoints that enforce scope checks. As a result, identity information remains accessible through the OIDC endpoint regardless of the scopes assigned to the API token. ### Details Gitea supports scoped personal access tokens and enforces scope checks on user-related REST API endpoints. For example, a token scoped only to `read:misc` is denied access to endpoints such as: | Endpoint | Required Scope | |----------|----------------| | `GET /api/v1/user` | `read:user` | | `GET /api/v1/user/emails` | `read:user` | | `GET /api/v1/user/orgs` | `read:organization` | Requests to these endpoints return: ```http 403 Forbidden ``` with a scope-related error. However, the same `read:misc` token can be supplied as a bearer credential to: ```http GET /login/oauth/userinfo Authorization: Bearer ``` a

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

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04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

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  1. GHSA-mg4f-x9v4-6h2p ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

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Public revision history

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  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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