vulnerability / NVI-00020091 / Revision 1
Tauri has an Origin Confusion Issue that Allows Remote Pages to Invoke Local-Only IPC Commands
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for tauri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
tauri
source listed>= 2.0.0, <= 2.11.0
### Summary A flaw in Tauri's `is_local_url()` function causes it to incorrectly classify remote URLs as trusted local origins on Windows and Android. On these systems, Tauri maps custom URI scheme protocols to `http://.localhost/` because those platforms' WebView implementations cannot serve custom URI schemes directly. The issue is that Tauri's check to see if the origin is local, only checks the first subdomain of the URL. An attacker can abuse this by hosting a page on a domain whose subdomain matches the custom scheme of the application (e.g. http://app.attacker.com/)." Example: - Local URL: `app://localhost/` → on Android/Windows: `http://app.localhost/` - The check passes for any URL starting with `http://app.`, including `http://app.evil.com/` As a result, the attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins. ### Details Vulnerable function: ```rust #[cfg(any(windows, target_os = "android"))] let local = { let protocol_url = self.manager().tauri_protocol_url(uses_https); let maybe_protocol = current_url
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.