vulnerability / NVI-00002493 / Revision 2
Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass
OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle, pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.8 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2025.4.6
## Summary An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised. ## Vulnerability Details ### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL The reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain. ```php final readonly class ResetPassword { public function __construct( private string $username, pri
pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6
## Summary An unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised. ## Vulnerability Details ### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL The reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain. ```php final readonly class ResetPassword { public function __construct( private string $username, pri
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2025.4.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-55207 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.