vulnerability / NVI-00002914 / Revision 5
Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
8.1 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.781%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.56068. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
backpack/crud
source listed>= 4.1.0, < 4.1.72
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listed>= 5.0.0, < 5.6.2
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listed>= 6.0.0, < 6.8.13
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listed>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.36
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
backpack/crud
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36
## Summary `Backpack\CRUD\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user. The vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying. ## Severity **High — CVSS 8.1** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` Attack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation. ## Impact A successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-54182 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-54182 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.