vulnerability / NVI-00003549 / Revision 2
WWBN AVideo has an Allowlisted downloadURL media extensions bypass SSRF protection and enable internal response exfiltration (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27732)
OSV carries this publisher advisory for WWBN/AVideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
WWBN/AVideo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 26.0
## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-27732 is incomplete. `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` still allows attacker-controlled `downloadURL` values with common media or archive extensions such as `.mp4`, `.mp3`, `.zip`, `.jpg`, `.png`, `.gif`, and `.webm` to bypass SSRF validation. The server then fetches the response and stores it as media content. This allows an authenticated uploader to turn the upload-by-URL flow into a reliable SSRF response-exfiltration primitive. ## Details `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts attacker-controlled `downloadURL` and passes it to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()`. Inside that function: 1. the URL extension is extracted from the attacker-controlled path 2. the extension is checked against an allowlist of normal encoder formats 3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is skipped for common media and archive extensions 4. the URL is fetched via `url_get_contents()` 5. the fetched body is written into video storage and exposed through normal media metadata The current code still contains: - an extension-based bypass for SSRF validation - no mandatory initial-destination SSRF enforcement insi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-39370 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.