vulnerability / NVI-00004162 / Revision 5
Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.1 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
3.1 LOW (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.296%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22359. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
contao/contao
source listed>= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7
## Summary An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`. The controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values. ## Root Cause `JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment: ```php $job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid); if (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) { throw $this->createNotFoundException(); } $attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier); ``` `Jobs::getAttachment(
contao/core-bundle
source listed>= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7
## Summary An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`. The controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values. ## Root Cause `JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment: ```php $job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid); if (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) { throw $this->createNotFoundException(); } $attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier); ``` `Jobs::getAttachment(
contao/contao
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7
## Summary An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`. The controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values. ## Root Cause `JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment: ```php $job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid); if (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) { throw $this->createNotFoundException(); } $attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier); ``` `Jobs::getAttachment(
contao/core-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7
## Summary An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`. The controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values. ## Root Cause `JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment: ```php $job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid); if (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) { throw $this->createNotFoundException(); } $attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier); ``` `Jobs::getAttachment(
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-55825 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-55825 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.