vulnerability / NVI-00004691 / Revision 5
Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
1.506%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.74376. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
symfony/symfony
source listed>= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/symfony
source listed>= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/symfony
source listed>= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listed>= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listed>= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listed>= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
symfony/twilio-notifier
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-47212 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-47212 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.