vulnerability / NVI-00005004 / Revision 5
Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
3.5 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
3.5 LOW (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.115%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.01556. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
contao/core-bundle
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 5.3.50
`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug. ### Impact An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it. **Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.
contao/core-bundle
source listed>= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12
`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug. ### Impact An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it. **Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.
contao/core-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50
`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug. ### Impact An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it. **Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.
contao/core-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12
`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug. ### Impact An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it. **Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-107848 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-107848 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.