vulnerability / NVI-00005492 / Revision 3
Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.681%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.52468. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listed< 2.2.8
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listed>= 3.0.0, < 3.2.4
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listed>= 3.3.0, < 3.3.1
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.2.8
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.2.4
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.3.1
### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. ### Patches Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.8 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.2.4 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.3.1 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-68500 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.