vulnerability / NVI-00006151 / Revision 2
adawolfa/isdoc: Uncontrolled resource consumption (decompression bomb) when reading untrusted ISDOCX or PDF files
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
adawolfa/isdoc
source listed>= 1.6.0, < 1.6.1
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listed>= 1.5.0, < 1.5.1
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listed>= 1.4.0, < 1.4.3
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listed< 1.4.0
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.6.0; fixed 1.6.1
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.5.0; fixed 1.5.1
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.4.0; fixed 1.4.3
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
adawolfa/isdoc
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0
### Impact `adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes: - **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap. - **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported. - **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound. Exploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only. ### Patches Fixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.5.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.4.3 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.