vulnerability / NVI-00006553 / Revision 3
Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure
OSV carries this publisher advisory for shopware/platform, shopware/platform, shopware/core, shopware/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.457%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3965. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
shopware/platform
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1
## Summary A low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API. **OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control ## Root Cause The `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it. The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption. **Three endpoints combine to form the attack:** 1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**) 2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**) 3. `PATCH /api
shopware/platform
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18
## Summary A low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API. **OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control ## Root Cause The `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it. The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption. **Three endpoints combine to form the attack:** 1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**) 2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**) 3. `PATCH /api
shopware/core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1
## Summary A low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API. **OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control ## Root Cause The `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it. The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption. **Three endpoints combine to form the attack:** 1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**) 2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**) 3. `PATCH /api
shopware/core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18
## Summary A low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API. **OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control ## Root Cause The `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it. The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption. **Three endpoints combine to form the attack:** 1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**) 2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**) 3. `PATCH /api
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-48009 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-48009 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.