vulnerability / NVI-00007873 / Revision 3
Symfony's Mailjet Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the Configured Secret — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection
OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/lox24-notifier, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.445%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.38747. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
symfony/lox24-notifier
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/lox24-notifier
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/mailjet-mailer
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/mailjet-mailer
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
symfony/mailjet-mailer
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12
### Description The Mailjet mailer bridge and the LOX24 SMS notifier bridge both ship webhook request parsers used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks each provider POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Their `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` methods receive the configured webhook secret but never read it; they convert and return the payload unconditionally. As a result, an application that wires up either webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a webhook secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake bounce / blocked / spam / open / click / delivery events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc. ### Resolution `MailjetRequestParser::doParse()` now rejects the request unless it carries the expected HTTP Basic credentials, Mailjet's webhook authentication mechanism, using a constant-time comparison. The configured webhook secret is matched against the credentials embedded in the Mailjet webhook URL as `user:password` (use `:password` when the URL has no username). `Lox24RequestParser::doParse()` now
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/lox24-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailjet-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-64hg-93w9-fc35 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-45754 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.