vulnerability / NVI-00008951 / Revision 4
Highcharts Core: `javascript:` URL in an `xlink:href` attribute survives text filtering and reaches exported charts
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for highcharts, highcharts, highcharts. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.2 HIGH (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.337%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27164. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
highcharts
source listed>= 10.3.2, < 11.4.9
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
highcharts
source listed>= 12.0.0, < 12.6.2
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
highcharts
source listed>= 13.0.0, <= 13.1.0
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
highcharts
source listedSEMVER: introduced 10.3.2; fixed 11.4.9
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
highcharts
source listedSEMVER: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.6.2
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
highcharts
source listedSEMVER: introduced 13.0.0; fixed 13.1.1
### Impact The filter applied to markup in text options checks `href`, `src` and a few similar attributes against an allowed-scheme list, but accepts `xlink:href` without that check, so an SVG anchor whose `xlink:href` is a `javascript:` URL passes the filter, whether or not the option is rendered with `useHTML`. In the live page the attribute is written without the XLink namespace, so browsers do not treat the anchor as a link there. The attribute is preserved verbatim in the chart's serialised output: the SVG produced by the exporting module, including the default SVG download, declares the XLink namespace and contains the anchor, and so does the markup of the chart container. Any document that parses that output again, such as the downloaded SVG opened in a browser or a page that inlines exported or server-rendered chart markup, then holds a working link, and an attacker who controls the chart configuration can thereby run script in the origin of that document when a user activates the link. Exploitation requires that untrusted data reach a text option such as the title, that the chart be exported or its markup be serialised and parsed again, and that a user activate the link.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.4.9 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.6.2 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 13.1.1 for highcharts. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-mw4f-gj5x-6xr4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-116796 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-116796 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.