vulnerability / NVI-00009174 / Revision 3
Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the attacker in as the victim
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for social-auth-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.157%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.04851. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
social-auth-core
source listed<= 6.1.1
### Summary The generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user's session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login. So the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim's unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker's own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim's `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker's session, and the nonce in the victim's ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker's browser is now logged in as the victim. PKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the defaul
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-115910 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.