supply chain event / NVI-00009673 / Revision 1
Malicious code in crypti-toolbox (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for crypti-toolbox. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
crypti-toolbox
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (5ec4d5d5915335d90b2f18b45b050936fa5d2db9d176d7d081bd8c292c7c6795) On `gem install`, the native extension script ext/crypti-toolbox/extconf.rb runs an environment-fingerprinting routine that bails out on CI runners, ephemeral/sandbox hostnames, generated or analysis-shaped usernames, analysis path prefixes (/opt/rubygems, /tmp, /workspace), low machine uptime, and hosts lacking developer artifacts (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.gem/credentials). On hosts that pass those checks, the script base64-decodes a Ruby snippet and passes it to eval inside a double-forked, setsid-detached child that sleeps 20-40 minutes and then curls a tarball from http://45.138.122.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it to /tmp/.w1, and executes the embedded wg_install.sh under bash. The destination URL is hidden as a hex string XORed with a 4-byte key, and the shell command is wrapped in a base64-encoded eval payload. There is no pin, hash, or signature on the fetched content, the destination is a bare IP unrelated to any declared publisher, and the sandbox-evasion and daemonization logic exist only to attack real developer workstations while hiding from analysis environ
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pv2w-f5fh-p8xw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.