supply chain event / NVI-00009901 / Revision 1
Malicious code in testrrrd (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd, testrrrd. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
testrrrd
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 0.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 99.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 1.1.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
testrrrd
source listed= 2.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (91a77cc9dbdff4799414082dc85fc6581b9f2d7297136dea8c50540f7d5244ad) On `npm install`, package.json `scripts.postinstall` runs `node beacon.cjs`, which POSTs a JSON payload containing the installer's hostname (`os.hostname()`), install path (`__dirname`), current working directory (`process.cwd()`), Node version, and package identifier over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The same beacon is re-triggered at import time: `index.js` (the declared `main`) calls `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` and then exports a `Proxy` whose `get` trap returns a no-op for any member access, so consumers importing arbitrary names from the package continue past the callback. The dual trigger ensures the callback fires even when lifecycle scripts are suppressed (e.g. `npm install --ignore-scripts`), and the Proxy shim conceals that the package provides no legitimate functionality. The destination is a bare IPv4 address on a non-standard port unrelated to any declared publisher, and the transport is unencrypted. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-package
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w6fg-gwpf-x5xf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.