supply chain event / NVI-00010060 / Revision 1
Malicious code in bitcoin-address-utils (RubyGems)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for bitcoin-address-utils. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
bitcoin-address-utils
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (8af579a1726db72e88f7c1755ebdec49a2d0a944d0e42a0fb36566d70d751e17) The gem's native-extension build script extconf.rb, which runs automatically during `gem install`, decodes a base64-wrapped Ruby payload that XOR-decodes a hardcoded URL (approximately http://45.13.8.12:8092/wgkit.tar.gz, overridable via ENV['WG_KIT_URL']), downloads a tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it, and executes the embedded wg_install.sh via bash. Execution is double-forked and detached so it survives after the install process exits. The shipped C extension source is a two-line empty stub, so the extension exists only to run the dropper. The script contains anti-analysis gating: it refuses to execute inside CI, on ephemeral or sandbox hosts, under usernames matching /uA\d+|sandbox|tester|analys|scanner/, on analysis paths such as /tmp, /var/tmp, /opt/rubygems, /workspace, and on hosts with uptime below 1800 seconds, and only detonates when developer-signal files exist (~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gem/credentials, ~/.bundle). A 20-40 minute random sleep precedes execution. The attacker-controlled endpoint is a bare IP on a non-standard port with no pinning, hash verification
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pmhw-48q6-rhv3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.