vulnerability / NVI-00010122 / Revision 5
fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via unchecked WHATWG host canonicalization
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fast-uri, fast-uri, fast-uri. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
4.8 MEDIUM (3.1)
ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.255%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17102. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
fast-uri
source listed>= 2.4.2, < 2.4.8
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
fast-uri
source listed>= 3.1.3, < 3.1.9
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
fast-uri
source listed>= 4.0.1, < 4.2.3
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
fast-uri
source listedSEMVER: introduced 2.4.2; fixed 2.4.8
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
fast-uri
source listedSEMVER: introduced 3.1.3; fixed 3.1.9
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
fast-uri
source listedSEMVER: introduced 4.0.1; fixed 4.2.3
### Impact `fast-uri` versions `>= 2.4.2, = 3.1.3, = 4.0.1, <= 4.2.2` can silently rewrite the host of an HTTP-family URL (`http`, `https`, `ws`, `wss`, or any scheme with `domainHost: true`). For those schemes `canonicalizeHost()` passes the parsed host to the WHATWG `URL` parser and adopts its `.hostname` without checking that the parser read the whole input as a host. RFC 3986 permits `@` inside the host group and the WHATWG parser strips TAB, LF, and CR, so the authority `fast-uri` reports is rewritten by that second parser with no `error` set: data before an `@` is dropped and whitespace is removed. For example, `fast-uri` parses `http://a@b@evil.example/` to host `evil.example` (dropping the `b` segment), and a host containing a raw TAB, CR, or LF has those characters stripped. `equal()` then treats a whitespace-smuggled host as the same as the clean one, and `resolve()` rewrites the authority the same way. Applications that use `fast-uri` to enforce host-based policy (denylists, loopback filtering, redirect validation, outbound proxy routing) on one representation, such as the raw input, see a policy/use desync: the canonical host `fast-uri`
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.8 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.9 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.3 for fast-uri. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-wjr9-j795-jxcr ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-110180 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-110180 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.