vulnerability / NVI-00010585 / Revision 3
ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.315%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24412. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
ip-address
source listed<= 10.7.3
### Summary `new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond. An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect. ### Details The constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left: ```ts const zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address); if (zone) { this.zone = zone[0]; address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, ''); } const longest = this.groups * 5 + 5; if (address.length > longest) { throw new AddressError(`IP
ip-address
source listedSEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 10.7.4
### Summary `new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond. An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect. ### Details The constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left: ```ts const zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address); if (zone) { this.zone = zone[0]; address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, ''); } const longest = this.groups * 5 + 5; if (address.length > longest) { throw new AddressError(`IP
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.7.4 for ip-address. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-111997 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.