supply chain event / NVI-00011157 / Revision 1
Malicious code in pino-ulid (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for pino-ulid, pino-ulid, pino-ulid, pino-ulid. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
pino-ulid
source listed= 2.12.3
## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779) pino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/
pino-ulid
source listed> 0
## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779) pino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/
pino-ulid
source listed= 3.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779) pino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/
pino-ulid
source listed= 2.12.2
## Source: amazon-inspector (ade54621ac8726adc77fa29c4176808cdf82d0d1f8e45c2e051a17b1fd515779) pino-ulid impersonates the popular `pino` and `ulid` packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json `postinstall` hook runs `node dist/node/utils.js`, which spawns `dist/node/payload.js` detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB `dist/node/payload.js` self-labels as `Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload`, includes the `ws` client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via `Buffer.from(enc, 'base64')`, derives a per-host id via `getSystemMachineId`/`defaultAgentId`, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its `ws.on('message',...)` handler reaches `execSync`/`spawnSync` sinks and writes attacker-supplied `task.contentBase64` bytes to disk via `writeFile`, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service` and/or `~/.config/
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-5qw6-rpv6-623h ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.