vulnerability / NVI-00011730 / Revision 2
launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for launch-editor, vite, vite, vite, vite. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
launch-editor
source listed<= 2.14.1
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite
source listed>= 8.3.0, <= 8.3.2
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite
source listed>= 8.2.0, <= 8.2.3
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite
source listed>= 8.0.0, <= 8.1.5
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite
source listed>= 7.0.0, <= 7.3.6
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite
source listed<= 6.4.3
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
vite-plus
source listed<= 1.0.0
### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` files on Windows cannot be called directly using `child_process.spawn` and requires passing them as an argument of `cmd.exe`. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to `cmd.exe`. But `launch-editor` did not escape `%` which is used for environment variables. Because `launch-editor` checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file. - If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcom
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-112943 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.