vulnerability / NVI-00011773 / Revision 3
Backstage: Explicit negative email verification can be ignored during shared OAuth profile normalization
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @backstage/plugin-auth-node, @backstage/plugin-auth-node. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.396%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3382. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@backstage/plugin-auth-node
source listed>= 0.3.0, < 0.6.15
### Impact Several Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`. Exploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions. An absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning. This advisory covers the shared Pass
@backstage/plugin-auth-node
source listed>= 0.7.0, < 0.7.5
### Impact Several Passport-based authentication providers use shared OAuth profile normalization from `@backstage/plugin-auth-node`. Affected versions may pass an email to email-based sign-in resolvers even when verification metadata supplied for that same address is explicitly negative. The ID-token-only fallback likewise did not consistently respect `email_verified: false`. Exploitation requires a deployment where an admitted identity-provider user can supply or change an email address without verification and Backstage uses that profile email to resolve catalog identities. In that configuration, the user may be able to assume another catalog identity and obtain its associated access and permissions. An absent `email_verified` claim is not by itself considered an affected condition. Some providers rely on authoritative organizational provisioning and intentionally omit the optional claim. Operators using email-based sign-in resolution must ensure that the configured provider restricts sign-in to the intended user population and supplies an authoritative email address, either through provider verification or trusted immutable provisioning. This advisory covers the shared Pass
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xm5q-p7w3-x6cp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-106460 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.