vulnerability / NVI-00013173 / Revision 2
plone.app.portlets Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via TALES Injection
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.9 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.638%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50737. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
plone.app.portlets
source listed>= 7.0.0, <= 7.0.1
### Impact The Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code. This is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process. ### Patches The problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets` * For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2. * For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4. * For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: - Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to
plone.app.portlets
source listed>= 6.0.0, <= 6.0.3
### Impact The Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code. This is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process. ### Patches The problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets` * For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2. * For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4. * For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: - Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to
plone.app.portlets
source listed>= 5.0.0, <= 5.0.7
### Impact The Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code. This is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process. ### Patches The problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets` * For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2. * For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4. * For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible: - Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-57149 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.