vulnerability / NVI-00014096 / Revision 1
@hono/oauth-providers: OAuth state check fails open on omitted state, enabling login CSRF and forced account linking
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @hono/oauth-providers. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.4 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@hono/oauth-providers
source listed< 0.8.6
### Summary The built-in social login providers accept an OAuth callback even when the `state` value is absent on both sides, so the anti-CSRF check passes for a callback that never came from a genuine login attempt. This defeats the `state`-based CSRF protection under default usage. ### Details The `state` check treated two absent values as a match, so a callback that omits `state` — and for which no `state` was ever stored — was allowed to redeem the authorization code. Hono's `csrf()` middleware does not help: it only inspects form-style requests, while the OAuth callback is a top-level `GET` navigation it treats as safe. This affects the `google`, `github`, `facebook`, `discord`, `twitch`, `linkedin`, and `msentra` providers. The `x` (Twitter) provider is not exploitable due to its PKCE binding. ### Impact An attacker can make a victim's browser complete an OAuth callback that binds the attacker's identity instead of the victim's, leading to login CSRF (the victim silently acts inside the attacker's account) or forced account linking (the attacker's identity is linked to the victim's account, enabling later sign-in as the victim). Affects applications using an affected pr
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-fm3f-ch8h-qw8q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.