vulnerability / NVI-00014183 / Revision 1
Kargo has Open Redirect in UI OIDC Login Flow via redirectTo Query Parameter
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
github.com/akuity/kargo
source listed< 1.7.10
## Summary The Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance. The principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin
github.com/akuity/kargo
source listed>= 1.8.0, < 1.8.13
## Summary The Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance. The principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin
github.com/akuity/kargo
source listed>= 1.9.0, < 1.9.8
## Summary The Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance. The principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin
github.com/akuity/kargo
source listed>= 1.10.0, < 1.10.2
## Summary The Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin. An attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance. The principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.