vulnerability / NVI-00014998 / Revision 1
Glances has a command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction
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01 / Meaning
Why it matters
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02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
glances
source listed<= 4.5.5
### Summary The Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run when a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose variables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container name or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a local, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name and command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which interprets `&&`, `|` and `>` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators. `glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which strips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering. The sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed **across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache rendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables (`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{&a}}{{&b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end with `&` and the second begin with `&`, the rendered command contains a real `&&`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`&` in each value pass
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
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04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3 ↗
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
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