vulnerability / NVI-00015221 / Revision 1
Better Auth: Account takeover via pre-account hijacking on magic-link and email-OTP sign-in
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for better-auth, better-auth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.3 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
better-auth
source listed>= 1.1.3, < 1.6.22
### Am I affected You are affected if all of the following hold: - You run a `better-auth` version below 1.6.22, or a `1.7.0-beta` below `1.7.0-beta.10`. - You enable the magic-link plugin or the email-OTP plugin. - You also enable email and password sign-up with open registration. - An account can exist at an address before its owner first signs in with the passwordless flow. ### Summary An attacker can keep password access to a victim's account after the victim starts using it. The attack runs in three steps. First, with open registration, the attacker signs up using the victim's email and a password the attacker picks. The account stays unverified, so the attacker cannot use it yet. Later the real owner signs in with a magic link or an email OTP. That step marks the account verified, and the attacker's password now works on it. ### Details When an account already exists for an address, magic-link verification and email-OTP sign-in both sign in to that account. They mark it verified and issue a session. Before the fix, neither one removed a password set while the account was still unverified. Neither one revoked existing sessions. So a password set before anyone proved cont
better-auth
source listed>= 1.7.0-beta.0, < 1.7.0-beta.10
### Am I affected You are affected if all of the following hold: - You run a `better-auth` version below 1.6.22, or a `1.7.0-beta` below `1.7.0-beta.10`. - You enable the magic-link plugin or the email-OTP plugin. - You also enable email and password sign-up with open registration. - An account can exist at an address before its owner first signs in with the passwordless flow. ### Summary An attacker can keep password access to a victim's account after the victim starts using it. The attack runs in three steps. First, with open registration, the attacker signs up using the victim's email and a password the attacker picks. The account stays unverified, so the attacker cannot use it yet. Later the real owner signs in with a magic link or an email OTP. That step marks the account verified, and the attacker's password now works on it. ### Details When an account already exists for an address, magic-link verification and email-OTP sign-in both sign in to that account. They mark it verified and issue a session. Before the fix, neither one removed a password set while the account was still unverified. Neither one revoked existing sessions. So a password set before anyone proved cont
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qq9h-g4jm-xgf3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.