vulnerability / NVI-00015240 / Revision 2
Electron: Context isolation bypass via Function.prototype.bind hijack
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for electron, electron, electron, electron. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
7.5 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
electron
source listed< 39.8.9
### Impact Apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.5` * `41.2.2` * `40.9.2` * `39.8.9` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 40.0.0-alpha.1, < 40.9.2
### Impact Apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.5` * `41.2.2` * `40.9.2` * `39.8.9` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 41.0.0-alpha.1, < 41.2.2
### Impact Apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.5` * `41.2.2` * `40.9.2` * `39.8.9` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org
electron
source listed>= 42.0.0-alpha.1, < 42.0.0-beta.5
### Impact Apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via `contextBridge` may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with `nodeIntegration` enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via `contextBridge` — the standard pattern for wrapping `ipcRenderer.invoke` — in windows that load untrusted content. Apps that never load untrusted content in those windows are not affected. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.5` * `41.2.2` * `40.9.2` * `39.8.9` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at security@electronjs.org
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-h7rp-cf8h-j98x ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- CVE-2026-70601 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.