vulnerability / NVI-00016046 / Revision 1
Netty: Missing CertificateID Validation in OCSP Response Allows Replay Attacks
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp, io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.4 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp
source listed>= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.16.Final
### Summary Netty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate. ### Details `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated. When `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload. A bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be
io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp
source listed< 4.1.136.Final
### Summary Netty's OcspClient does not validate that the CertificateID in an OCSP response matches the requested CertificateID. A bad actor can replay a `GOOD` status response issued for an unrelated certificate (by the same CA) to bypass revocation checks for any certificate. ### Details `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspClient#validateResponse` fails to assert that the CertificateID within the returned `BasicOCSPResp` matches the original certificate being validated. When `OcspClient.query(...)` executes, it builds an OCSP request using the victim certificate's serial number and issuer hash. It then sends this request and receives a response. While the client verifies the signature of the response against the trusted issuer (or a valid responder chain), it never checks the CertificateID inside the response payload. A bad actor who has access to any other valid, non-revoked certificate issued by the same CA can obtain a legitimately signed OCSP response indicating that the unrelated certificate is `GOOD`. The bad actor can then return this valid response to the Netty client when it queries the status of any other certificate (e.g., a revoked certificate) issued by the same CA. Be
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-272m-gcwp-mpwg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.