vulnerability / NVI-00016056 / Revision 1
@angular/platform-server: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server, @angular/platform-server. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-rc.2
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``). `domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.16
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``). `domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.24
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``). `domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut
@angular/platform-server
source listed>= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.25
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``). `domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut
@angular/platform-server
source listed<= 18.2.14
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`'s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of raw-text elements (such as ``, ``, and ``). `domino` supports escaping raw-text elements during serialization to prevent closing-tag breakout. However, a **Unicode index alignment bug** existed in this escaping logic. In JavaScript, string lengths and character indices are calculated based on UTF-16 code units (where astral characters—such as emojis—occupy 2 code units / 4 bytes). If the bound dynamic text contained astral Unicode characters _before_ the closing tag (e.g. ``, ``, or ``), the index offset calculation in `domino`'s replacement logic shifted. This misalignment caused `domino` to fail to replace or escape the closing tag, leaving it raw and unescaped in the output HTML. An attacker who controls the dynamic text can supply a payload containing both an astral Unicode character and a closing tag (e.g., `😀alert(1)`). When serialized on the server during SSR, the browser parses the unescaped closing tag, exits the raw-text context early, and execut
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-hqr9-c56f-3x7f ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.