vulnerability / NVI-00016161 / Revision 1
NocoDB: OAuth Authorization Code Race Condition
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nocodb. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
nocodb
source listed<= 2026.05.0
### Summary Two concurrent token-exchange requests using the same OAuth authorization code could each mint a distinct valid `(access_token, refresh_token)` pair, breaking the single-use guarantee that PKCE relies on. ### Details The token-exchange flow read `is_used` and called `markAsUsed` as an unconditional update at the end of the path. A new `OAuthAuthorizationCode.claimByCode` method now performs an atomic compare-and-swap (`WHERE code = ? AND is_used = false`) and is called immediately before `OAuthToken.insert`, after redirect-URI, PKCE, and client authentication have all succeeded. Only the first concurrent caller's `UPDATE` wins; the rest see `invalid_grant: Authorization code has already been used`. ### Impact An attacker who has observed an authorization code and the corresponding PKCE verifier (for example through a malicious OAuth-aware client or by racing a real exchange) could obtain a long-lived refresh token in addition to the legitimate one. ### Credit This issue was reported by @eddieran.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
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- GHSA-8m7c-hf24-5g47 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
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Public revision history
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- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.