vulnerability / NVI-00016293 / Revision 1
Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for code.gitea.io/gitea. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.5 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
code.gitea.io/gitea
source listed< 1.27.0
# Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration ## Summary Gitea validates the user-supplied repository migration URL, but the actual clone and later mirror fetch operations are performed by the Git command-line client without disabling HTTP redirects. Git's default `http.followRedirects=initial` follows the first redirect and then uses the redirected URL as the base for later repository object requests. This creates a URL-policy bypass, SSRF, and repository exfiltration primitive. A low-privileged authenticated user can submit an allowed public Git URL that redirects the Gitea server to an otherwise blocked or internal Git HTTP(S) endpoint. Local validation confirmed that Git followed a first-hop redirect to `127.0.0.1`, fetched Git objects, and completed the clone; `git -c http.followRedirects=false clone` blocked the same path. The main impact is internal Git repository exfiltration into an attacker-controlled Gitea repository. Pull mirrors increase risk because scheduled `git fetch --tags` operations can keep following the redirect and collect future internal commits. This is High severity by
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.