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vulnerability / NVI-00016419 / Revision 1

n8n: Account Takeover via Unverified Email Claim in Token Exchange Embed Login

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for n8n, n8n. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-8342-988q-86cr

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

n8n

source listed
  • >= 2.32.0, < 2.32.1

## Impact In an n8n instance, when a validly-signed incoming token was matched to a local account by its email claim, the service did not check that the trusted key's permitted role ceiling covered that account, nor that the email claim was verified. As a result, anyone able to obtain a token accepted by one of the configured trusted keys, for example a trusted issuer that emitted unverified email addresses, could authenticate as any existing user, gaining full account control. This issue only affects instances where the embed login feature is enabled and at least one trusted key source is configured. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the embed login feature by setting `N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=false`. - If embed login cannot be disabled, restrict network access to the n8n instance to fully trusted parties only, and audit all configured trusted keys and their `allowedRoles` assignments. - Review `auth_identity` records for unexpected `token

GitHub Advisory Database

n8n

source listed
  • < 2.31.5

## Impact In an n8n instance, when a validly-signed incoming token was matched to a local account by its email claim, the service did not check that the trusted key's permitted role ceiling covered that account, nor that the email claim was verified. As a result, anyone able to obtain a token accepted by one of the configured trusted keys, for example a trusted issuer that emitted unverified email addresses, could authenticate as any existing user, gaining full account control. This issue only affects instances where the embed login feature is enabled and at least one trusted key source is configured. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the embed login feature by setting `N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=false`. - If embed login cannot be disabled, restrict network access to the n8n instance to fully trusted parties only, and audit all configured trusted keys and their `allowedRoles` assignments. - Review `auth_identity` records for unexpected `token

GitHub Advisory Database

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
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05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-8342-988q-86cr ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

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The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

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