vulnerability / NVI-00017477 / Revision 1
pnpm Has an Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pnpm, pnpm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.8 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
pnpm
source listed>= 11.0.0, < 11.4.0
## Summary pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap. ## Vulnerability Details The `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate. ```typescript // worker/src/start.ts:189-204 function addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) { if (integrity) { // false when integrity is undefined const { algorithm, he
pnpm
source listed< 10.34.1
## Summary pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap. ## Vulnerability Details The `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate. ```typescript // worker/src/start.ts:189-204 function addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) { if (integrity) { // false when integrity is undefined const { algorithm, he
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.