vulnerability / NVI-00017765 / Revision 1
Boxlite: Path Traversal Vulnerability Leads to Arbitrary File Write on the Host
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for boxlite, boxlite-cli, boxlite, @boxlite-ai/boxlite, github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
9.6 critical
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
boxlite
source listed< 0.9.0
#### Summary Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host. #### Details 1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction **File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:** ```rust pub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult { // ... apply_oci_layer(reader, dest) } ``` **Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig
boxlite-cli
source listed< 0.9.0
#### Summary Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host. #### Details 1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction **File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:** ```rust pub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult { // ... apply_oci_layer(reader, dest) } ``` **Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig
@boxlite-ai/boxlite
source listed< 0.9.0
#### Summary Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host. #### Details 1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction **File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:** ```rust pub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult { // ... apply_oci_layer(reader, dest) } ``` **Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig
github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite/sdks/go
source listed< 0.9.0
#### Summary Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and run OCI containers within them. Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host. #### Details 1. Entry Point — OCI Layer Tarball Extraction **File:** `boxlite/src/images/archive/tar.rs` **Function:** `extract_layer_tarball_streaming()` (line 24) **Code:** ```rust pub fn extract_layer_tarball_streaming(tarball_path: &Path, dest: &Path) -> BoxliteResult { // ... apply_oci_layer(reader, dest) } ``` **Issue:** The function passes the tar reader into `apply_oci_layer`. The tarball comes from a registry blob that has passed SHA256 integrity verification against the manifest dig
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.